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民主政治方面有关论文范本,与经济学学年文范文2016年相关毕业论文致谢

本论文是一篇民主政治方面有关毕业论文致谢,关于经济学学年文范文2016年相关本科毕业论文范文。免费优秀的关于民主政治及政治经济学及政治经济方面论文范文资料,适合民主政治论文写作的大学硕士及本科毕业论文开题报告范文和学术职称论文参考文献下载。

ddispute,"willingbuyer-willingseller"policyinSouthAfrica'slandreform,andmassprivatizationinpost-SovietRussiatofurtherillustratethepoliticalnaivetyandpolicydilemmaembeddedinsuchamyth.Insum,unconditionaladvocacyfor"securepropertyrights"mayactuallyhindertheinitiationordevelopmentofcapitalism.11:40-12:10产权的政治与巴西经济奇迹的中断作者sjtuhuangqixuan@gmail.摘要12:10-12:40SynergyThresholdforState-SocietyCooperation:TestingFormalModelUsingaLabExperiment作者a0028468@nus.edu.sg摘要Inthispaper,Iinvestigatethecircumstancesunderwhichstate-businesscooperationoccurs.Thisresearchdrawsontwostrandsofliterature:researchesontheroleofgovernmentindevelopmentandtheliteratureabouttherelationshipbetweenstateandsociety.Buildingonthisliterature,Ithendevelopmyargumentinanattempttoanswerthequestion,whencansuccessfulcoordinationbetweenstateandbusinessesberealized.Forthispurpose,Idevelopaformalmodel,whichshowsthatcooperationbetweenstateandbusinessescantakeplaceonlyifstate-societysynergy–plementaryrelationshipbetweenmunitiesandstateagencies–isaboveacertainlevel.Inotherwords,thereisasynergythresholdforstate-businesscooperation.Lowlevelsofstate-societysynergydonotfacilitatecooperationbetweenstateandbusinessactors.

Idesignalaboratoryexperimenttotestthehypothesis.Adoptingtheformaltheoryapproach(FTA),Iproposetotestthetheoreticalpredictionsofthemodelusingaseriesofcontrolledlabexperimentsusingundergraduatestudentsassubjects.Theexperimentsareconductedviaputersandtheprogramsarewrittenwiththesoftwarez-Tree,atoolboxforeconomicexperimentsdevelopedbyZurich.Thesubjectsarerandomlyassignedintopairsandengageinaroleplay.Theputerprogramrandomizesthetreatmentandrecordsthesubjects'responsesundertreatmentscorrespondingtovariouslevelsofsynergy.Thedatacollectedfromallsessionsareaggregatedandanalyzedstatistically,usingsamplemeantestsandlogisticregression.Theanalysiscanbemademoresophisticatedbyincorporatingquantalresponseequilibrium(QRE).Overall,randomizationandcontrolledsettingoftheexperimentdeliverarelativelyhighdegreeofinternalvalidity.

2,多样的政治分析

14:00-15:20

北大公共政策国际论坛niou@duke.edu

摘要:

秘密投票是一种手段和权利,他让投票者能自由的表达意愿,不受金钱,暴力,威胁,利诱的影响,它是保障民主制度运作最基本也是最重要的条件.但在人类政治文明史上,"公开"表决是常态,"秘密"投票反而是特例,原因是既得利益者,当权派为了保持他们的统治优势,一定会想方设法的操纵选举结果,自然不会采用秘密投票.然而,如果这个解释有说服力,那在什么条件下"秘密投票"能突破金钱暴力的封锁,应运而生本文尝试回答这个问题.

要有系统的了解"秘密投票"背后的政治博弈,我们需要从古今中外的历史中,去发掘有那些社会使用过秘密投票,探讨当时的时代背景,了解为什么当权派无法继续用金钱暴力来操纵选举.本文也特别介绍中国共产党于1930,40年代,在边区,解放区推行的一种秘密投票办法:"豆选".为什么共产党在当时那么大费周章的推行豆选"豆选"给中国政治改革的前景能提供什么样的启示

主持人:包刚升,复旦大学

15:30-16:00MotivatingCadresbyTournaments:ThePingbiModeinContemporaryChina作者李振,上海交大sjtu.lizhen@gmail.摘要LocalgovernmentofficialsaremotivatedbyavarietyofthepingbischemesincontemporaryChina.OnesuchmotivationalpetitionistheNationalHygienicCityCampaignwhichaimstoraisestandardsinpublichygieneandisthepingbischemethatisexaminedinthisstudy.Organizationsofalltypes,whethertheyareinvolvedineconomicgrowthornot,areinfluencedbysuchschemesatvariouslevels.Centralgovernmentsetsoutthecriteriaofthepingbischemefortheguidanceofthelocalgovernmentdepartments.Thepingbimodeisoneofthetraditionaltoolsofgovernancewhichhavebenefitsaswellasdisadvantages,bothofwhichwillbeconsidered.16:00-16:30官员晋升激励与政府绩效目标设置——中国省级面板数据的实证研究作者ken0821@gmail.摘要31个省份的面板数据(1999-2016),首次实证分析了官员特征对政府绩效目标设置的影响.研究显示,政府官员的任期和职业背景都会影响其设置的预期经济增长目标.官员任期与政府绩效目标设置水平呈U型曲线关系,而本地升迁的政府官员往往会设置较高水平的经济增长目标.作为最早考察这一问题的研究之一,本文深化了人们对政府绩效目标设置逻辑的认识,也为干部人事管理制度改革提供了理论启示.16:30-17:00枪打出头鸟——地方官员晋升游戏中的表演与合谋(研究设计)作者南开大学cchsuin@gmail.摘要17:00-17:45《观看与表演——当代中国地方官场的晋升之道》书稿讨论作者刘骥,南开大学liujipku@gmail.摘要

12月2日比较政治分析:视角与案例

第一场主持人:朱天飚,北京大学

08:30-09:00InstitutionalConversionandIneffectiveness:HowChina'sPetitionSystemGeneratesNon-NormalPetitions作者陈慧荣,sjtuchenhuirong@gmail.摘要Whydopetitionersmovefromnormalappealingtonon-normalpetitions(feizhengchangshangfang)BasedonthefieldworkinShanghai,theauthorunpacksChina'spetitionsystemandexamineshowpetitionbureausclassifypetitionersintofirst-timepetitioners,repeatedpetitionersandnon-normalpetitionersandhandletheircasesverydifferently.Itisarguedthattheinstitutionalconversionandineffectivenessofpetitionsystem,amongotherfactors,generateslow-qualityhandlingoffirst-timepetitions(chufang初访)andmishandlingofrepeatedpetitions(chongfang重访),whichinturnpushpetitionerstoescalatetheirtacticsfromnormalappealingtonon-normalpetitioning.Localpetitionofficialsover

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民主政治方面有关论文范本,与经济学学年文范文2016年相关毕业论文致谢参考文献资料：